One of the most precious Hebrew manuscripts in the Bodleian library is a section of work by Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, known as Maimonides (1135-1204). This piece is from his Mishneh Torah, Repetition of the Law, and remarkably in his own handwriting (MS. Heb. d. 32). The Mishneh Torah was completed in 1180 and consists of a Jewish legal work by subject matter of the entire Talmudic and Gaonic literature of Jewish law. The manuscript, which is currently on display at the new Weston Library of the Bodleian Library, has about 200 pages and was bought through the Rev. G. J. Chester, in 1890, as part of the discovery of the Cairo Genizah. The Cairo Genizah is a designated room attached to the old Ben Ezra Synagogue in Cairo where discarded pages containing the name of G-d were deposited, to protect G-d’s name from profanation. It was allowed to accumulate over a period of about a thousand years.
Introduction
The manuscript (fols. 53b-54a) contains a draft of the parts of the Mishneh Torah that include the end of the section on Laws of Hire and the beginning of the section on Laws of Borrowing and Deposit. The significance of this discovery cannot be overstated as it not only presents one of the earliest versions of the Mishneh Torah that exists today in Maimonides' own handwriting but it gives us insight into the formulation of the work itself. It is clearly a draft copy that was undergoing edits in the text before the final version which we are accustomed to today was completed. It is therefore interesting when analyzing this manuscript to see that the version of the Oxford manuscript is significantly different than the published version. We will aim to present in this essay the significance of these changes and propose that a major dispute in Jewish law may become redundant in light of this early draft. I will first present the two editions relating to the subject of the liability of a borrower whose animal dies during work; highlight the difference between whether there is exemption of liability for an animal dying during work or even merely on the account of the work; and then present the established controversial view of Maimonides on this subject that a borower is exempt of liability only if the animal dies during the work itself. In conclusion I will argue that in light of the Cairo draft manuscript, Maimonides' view might not be dissimilar to the view of his oponents, thereby mitigating an 800 year old dispute in Jewish law.
I will then add that it is possible to defend Maimonides' view according to the published edition as well, despite the harsh criticism that he encountered by his medieval contemporaries and refutation by the legalists of the 16th century. I will attempt to do this by suggesting that Maimonides was not ignoring the meticulous wording of the Talmud but on the contrary his view is based on important insight in the reading of the Talmud. This will allow us to reaffirm the now widely held view in defence of Maimonides regarding his overall approach to the Talmud despite the criticism that he encountered during his lifetime.
Two editions – the draft and the published
The Oxford manuscript states as follows:
When a person borrows a utensil, an animal or other similar movable property from a colleague, and it is lost or stolen, or destroyed by factors beyond his control - e.g., an animal is injured, taken captive or dies - the borrower is required to make restitution for the entire worth of the article, as stated in Exodus (22:13): "If a person borrows an animal from a colleague and it will become injured or die, and the owner is not with him, he must make financial restitution.” When does the above apply? When the loss due to factors beyond his control does not take place while the borrower is working with the animal. If, however, a person borrows a colleague's animal to plough, and it dies while ploughing, or to travel to a particular place and the animal dies under him on that journey or he borrows a bucket to fill water with it and it falls apart in the cistern while he is filling it, or he borrows a hatchet to split wood and it breaks because of the chopping while he is splitting the wood, and in all analogous situations, he is not liable.
The above text seems to be succinct and clear. The borrower of the item is not liable if the loss takes place under a single condition: as part of the labour that it was borrowed for.
However, the published edition of the case adds to the text as follows:
When a person borrows utensils, an animal or other movable property from a colleague, and it is lost or stolen, or even if it is destroyed by factors beyond his control - e.g., an animal is injured, taken captive or dies - the borrower is required to make restitution for the entire worth of the article, as stated in Exodus (22:13): "If a person borrows an animal from a colleague and it will become injured or die, and the owner is not with him, he must make financial restitution." When does the above apply? When the loss due to factors beyond his control does not take place while the borrower is working with the animal. If, however, a person borrows a colleague's animal to plough, and it dies while ploughing, the borrower is not liable. If, however, the animal dies before he ploughed with it or after he ploughed with it, or he rode upon it or threshed with it and the animal died while he was threshing or riding, the borrower is liable to make financial restitution. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Similarly, if a person borrows an animal to travel to a particular place and the animal dies under him on that journey, he borrows a bucket to fill water with it and it falls apart in the cistern while he is filling it, he borrows a hatchet to split wood and it breaks because of the chopping while he is splitting the wood, he is not liable. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. The rationale is that he borrowed the article solely to perform this task, and he did not deviate from his original request.
The main difference between the two texts is the emphasis on the required condition for exemption of liability: that the animal died at the time of the ploughing. This is emphasized by the negation clause: ‘If, however, the animal dies before he ploughed with it or after he ploughed with it (or he rode upon it or threshed with it and the animal died while he was threshing or riding), the borrower is liable to make financial restitution.’
It would appear from the addition of the negation clause in the published edition that the text as found in the draft version, without even a marginal note of the negation clause, was not found to be sufficient. The reason for this may be that the draft edition may seem to imply that if the death of the animal takes place before or after the ploughing the borrower might in fact also be exempt as long as the death occurred due to the ploughing but not necessarily at the time of the ploughing. If this were the case, it would suggest Maimonides introducing a radical review and controversial departure from what is considered to be the long established reading of this law.
The history of the development of this law
We will present here the articulation of this controversy by explaining the origins of the dispute and how this argument seemed to have developed. The Biblical law of the liability of the borrower is first stated in Exodus (22:13): ‘If a person borrows an animal from a colleague and it will become injured or die, and the owner is not with him, he must make financial restitution.’
This law is documented in the Mishna (Bava Metzia 93a):
There are four types of custodians: an unpaid custodian, the borrower, a paid custodian and a renter. An unpaid custodian swears with regard to everything and is exempt of liability. The borrower is liable for everything. The paid custodian and the renter swear and are exempt of liability with regard to unavoidable mishap, like an animal that broke a limb, or was captured by armed brigands or died of natural causes and they pay for loss or theft.’
It would appear from the Biblical and Mishnaic law that a borrower bears complete liability for the fate of the borrowed item. If anything happens to it - even an unavoidable mishap - under his care, he must compensate the owner. The Talmud however argues that it is reasonable to stipulate that if one borrowed an item or an animal for a particular purpose and the item broke or the animal died due to the stress of the intended work one should not be liable. The argument that the Talmud makes is that surely the owner did not expect the borrower to keep the item or animal in a show case. The Talmud (Bava Metzia 96b-97a) states this argument in the form of four case studies as follows:
The sages propounded: What if the borrowed animal became emaciated through its work? Said one of the Rabbis, R’ Helkiah the son of R’ Avya by name: Then it follows that if it died through the work, he is certainly responsible. But let him say to the lender, ’I did not borrow for exhibition in a show case!’ But, said Raba, not only is it necessary to state that if it became emaciated through work he is not responsible, but even if it died through work, he is not liable, because he can say, ‘I did not borrow it so that it should stand in a show case!’ A man once borrowed an axe from his neighbour, and it broke. When he came before Raba, he said to him, ‘Go and bring witnesses that you did not put it to foreign use, and you are free from liability.' A man borrowed a bucket from his neighbour, and it broke. When he came before R. Papa, he said to him, ‘Go and bring witnesses that you did not put it to foreign use, and you are free from liability.’ A man borrowed a cat from his neighbour; the cat ate many mice, whereby it sickened and died. Now, R. Ashi sat and cogitated thereon: How is it in this case? Said R. Mordechai to R. Ashi: Thus did Abimi of Hagronia say: A man whom women killed (through excessive gratification) – for him there is no judgement nor judge.’
Three rationales to the non-liability clause of the borrower
Thus, the Talmud establishes this law to mean that although a borrower is normally liable for everything, if the intended work is the cause of the harm or death of the animal there is no liability. The rationale being that surely it was not borrowed to be exhibited in a showcase. This rationale is articulated further by Rabbi Moses ben Nachman Girondi, known as Nachmanides (1194 – 1270), in his commentary to the above-mentioned text of the Talmud. He argues that the rationale of the Talmud is not sufficient since we know from the Mishna that the borrower is fully responsible for the borrowed item. This then must include all possible scenarios, avoidable and unavoidable, and certainly if it was damaged due to his use of the item. Nachmanides suggests therefore, that in this case the negligent party is the owner not the borrower. The owner should have made sure not to lend an animal or item that cannot survive the intended purpose for which it was borrowed. The borrower would in such case not be liable.
Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet, known by his acronym Rashba (1235–1310) and teacher of Nachmanides makes the argument slightly differently. He suggests that it is reasonable to assume that the lender would have surely been aware of the possibility that the animal will become weak as a result of the work and thus accepts this responsibility. The death of the animal may be seen merely as an extension of the same liability as there is no essential difference between loss of energy to the degree of emaciation and the possibility of actually dying - ‘ma li kotla kula ma li kotla palga’.
Dispute emerges
From the time of the Mishna and Talmud until the 13th century there is no fundamental dispute pertaining to this law. This law however becomes the subject of a major dispute in the medieval period when Maimonides is drafting the law in his legal work Mishneh Torah. In the published edition of Maimonides, quoted above, he makes it clear that the exemption of liability of the borrower is only when the animal dies while the animal is actually ploughing the field. If however the animal dies before or afterwards due to exhaustion the borrower remains liable.
The case against Maimonides
The medieval Talmudic commentator and Halachist Rabbi Yom Tov ben Avraham Asevilli, commonly known by his acronym Ritva (1250-1330), writes that Maimonides is not correct in his view that the death of the animal must take place while ploughing for the borrower to be exempt from liability but rather, regardless of whether it dies while ploughing or afterwards due to exhaustion, the borrower is nonetheless exempt from liability.
The Ritva points out (as does the Rashba), that the Talmud (quoted above) explicitly defines the law as ‘died through (machmat) work’ not ‘at the time (b’shaat) of work’. A second argument is made by the Ritva that since the rationale for the overall exemption of liability by the borrower is, as Nachmanides suggests, that it assumes negligence to the lender for lending such an incapable animal in the first place, there is no reason to differentiate in this regard whether the animal collapsed while working or due to exhaustion afterwards as a result of the work. In both cases it is the lender that would be assumed to be negligent. Similarly, Nachmanides writes in his commentary to the Talmud (Bava Metzia 96b) that Maimonides is mistaken and Rashba likewise writes, though more tactfully, that the view of Maimonides is unclear (mechuvar).
A third argument is made by Russian born Talmudist Rabbi Samuel ben Joseph Strashun, known by his acronym Rashash (1794 – 1872). He constructs his argument based on the law pertaining to the exemption of liability for damages in unavoidable circumstances by a paid custodian. The Mishna states (Bava Metzia (93a):
If the animal died of natural causes, it is considered an unavoidable mishap. However, if the custodian afflicted it i.e. he starved it or made it stand in the sun during the summer or in the cold during the winter and it died, even if the death is attributable to another cause at a later time, it is not considered an unavoidable mishap and the custodian is liable, for perhaps it died as a delayed reaction to its mistreatment.
Rashash cites the above Mishnaic law of culpability by a paid custodian even in a case of delayed reaction to negligence as a basis to argue that similarly, in the case of the borrower, when there is a delayed reaction to the work and it dies later due to exhaustion it should be sufficient to exempt liability from the borrower. He makes this point further in the logical form of the Talmudic hermeneutical rationale Kal vachomer "a minori ad majus". If in the case of the paid custodian ‘delayed reaction’ to negligence is sufficient when the burden of proof is necessary to justify payment, certainly it should be sufficient to justify exemption of payment. This argument against Maimonides is compounded by the fact that Maimonides himself agrees with the stated law regarding the liability of a paid custodian in the case of delayed reaction to negligence. He writes in Mishneh Torah Laws of Hiring (3:9): ‘If an animal dies in an ordinary manner, this is considered to be a loss beyond the shepherd's control, and he is not liable. If he oppressed it and it died, it is not considered a loss beyond his control.’ Thus, these three arguments would seem to represent a strong case against the view of Maimonides, and his contemporaries therefore roundly reject his view as erroneous or unclear.
Opposition consolidated in law
The rejection of Maimonides’ view continues in the 14th century. Leading 14th century Spanish Halakhic authority Rabbi Vidal Tolosa, in his commentary to Mishneh Torah, Maggid Mishneh (Sheilah Ufikadon 1:1), argues that since we are not alleging that the borrower overworked the animal or changed the intended work, it should not make a difference whether it died while working or due to exhaustion; the borrower is exempt from liability. He concludes with the declaration that the law in fact follows the opinion of Nachmanides and Rashba. Similarly, Spanish Talmudist Rabbi Isaac ben Sheshet Perfet (1326 – 1408), known by his acronym Rivash, first attempts to defend Maimonides, but in the end also concludes that Maimonides’ view is not clear, and that Nachmanides and Rashba have already presented their view in opposition. The view of the Rivash is quoted by Rabbi Joseph Karo (1488-1575), author of the Shulchan Aruch (Code of Jewish Law), in his commentary to the Mishneh Torah, Kesef Mishneh. The opposition to Maimonides’ view is subsequently consolidated by Rabbi Joseph Karo’s agreement with Nachmanides and Rashba and codified in his most widely accepted Code of Jewish Law (Shulchan Aruch, laws of borrowing 340:2), completed in Safed 1563 and published in Venice 1565.
Is Maimonides defensible? A redundant dispute
I would like to propose in this essay, firstly, a mitigation of the argument against Maimonides’ in view of the draft manuscript of the Mishneh Torah at the Bodleian Library, and secondly, suggest a defence of Maimonides’ view according to how it is presented in the completed version of his work and as understood by Nachmanides and Rashba. Considering the draft version above one may argue that Maimonides’ drafting of the text, unlike the published edition, mitigates if not makes redundant this deep-seated dispute that has been running since the 13th century. It would seem that in truth there may not be an argument in the first place after all.
A key difference between the draft version and the published edition is the omission of the sentence: ‘If, however, the animal dies before he ploughed with it or after he ploughed with it, or he rode upon it or threshed with it and the animal died while he was threshing or riding, the borrower is liable to make financial restitution.‘
It is obvious that the reason for the addition of this sentence is because without it, it would have seemed that if the animal died after the work due to exhaustion the borrower would also not be liable. To clarify this point the extra paragraph was added. This would imply that in the draft where the paragraph is not found it is possible to construe the view of Maimonides similar to the view of Nachmanides and Rashba that as long as the animal died on account of the work the borrower is not liable. This would make the entire dispute outlined above redundant.
This position of Maimonides as reflected in the draft manuscript, as argued above, is in fact the approach of the Rivash, quoted above by Rabbi Joseph Karo, towards Maimonides in his published edition. The Rivash stands out from amongst the opponents of Maimonides in his attempt to reconcile the dispute. He does so by suggesting that in the text of the law regarding ‘a person who borrows an animal to travel to a particular place and the animal dies under him on that journey, he is not liable’ – the term ‘under him’ does not necessarily mean literally beneath him but rather while in his possession. Although the Rivash remains inconclusive, the omission and later addition of the paragraph, emphasizing the difference between during and after the work, would lend itself to this approach of reconciliation between the great legalists of the 13th century.
A defence of the published opinion of Maimonides
The dispute between Maimonides and his contemporaries, regarding liability of the borrower when the animal dies after the work, is however categorical, according to the published version of Maimonides. The slew of opinions against Maimonides in this regard remains almost without a single defendant. In this essay, in addition to arguing that according to the draft manuscript, there may not be any dispute in the first place, we would like to also present a defence of Maimonides according to the published edition where the dispute seems certain. The principle argument against Maimonides by Ritva, among others, is, as mentioned earlier, that Maimonides appears to be misreading the text of the Talmud and applies his ruling in disregard of the Talmud. The claim is that the Talmud states: ‘Raba said, if it died through (Machmat) work (not while working), he is not liable, because he can say, ‘I did not borrow it so that it should stand in a show case!’’
Maimonides and Talmud controversy
The undercurrent of this protest against Maimonides for disregarding the precise reading of the Talmud appears to be compounded by the major criticism that the opponents of Maimonides had towards his relationship with the Talmud. While Maimonides writes his Mishneh Torah almost completely on the basis of the work of the Talmud, he neglects to actually quote the sources of the Talmud in the work itself, not allowing students of the Talmud to understand how he constructs his laws.
The great critic of Maimonides, Rabbi Avraham ben David, known as Ra'avad (1125-1198) makes clear his criticism of Maimonides regarding his lack of sources:
This author abandoned the practice of all the previous authors, who would bring supports for their statements and quote them in the name of their sources. This was of great benefit because, at times, a judge would presume to forbid or permit [something] based on a specific source. If he knew that a greater authority holds a different opinion, he would retract his. However, in this instance, I do not know why I should retract from the tradition I received from my sources because of [the statements] in this work by this author.
This concern is further highlighted by a controversy about the intent of his work as outlined in Maimonides’ introduction to the Mishneh Torah. Maimonides writes:
To summarize: The intent of this text is that a person will not need another text at all with regard to any Jewish law. Rather, this text will be a compilation of the entire Oral Law, including also the ordinances, customs, and decrees that were enacted from the time of Moses, our teacher, until the completion of the Talmud as were explained by the Geonim in the texts they composed after the Talmud. Therefore, I have called this text, Mishneh Torah "the second to the Torah," with the intent that a person should first study the Written Law, and then study this text and comprehend the entire Oral Law from it, without having to study any other text between the two.
There is evidence of great concern during Maimonides’ life that he was encouraging the abandonment of the study of Talmud as a subject of the Torah worth studying and implying that it should be replaced by Maimonides’ own legal work of the Mishneh Torah. This is the background to a letter Maimonides wrote to his student Yosef regarding the purpose of his work Mishneh Torah (Igrot Harambam ch. 15, p. 254). In the introduction to the letter it relates an episode where Rabbi Avraham, son of Maimonides, was teaching his father’s Mishneh Torah in the study hall and a student asked him to explain the particular law in light of its deliberation in the Talmud pertaining to that law. Rabbi Avraham responded that the same scenario happened to his father while teaching the Mishneh Torah and his response to the Talmudist who posed the question was: if his intention was to teach the law in that method he would not have written the Mishneh Torah in the first place!
In this context Maimonides clarifies to his student Yosef that the purpose of his work was two fold, firstly, to assist people in remembering the Halachic law, and secondly, to guide those who many times get immersed in the theoretical disputation and reasoning of the Talmud, meanwhile forgetting the ultimate purpose of the study; to arrive at the conclusion of what the actual law is supposed to be. When considering this point of Maimonides, it is clear that he is not in fact discounting the importance of studying the Talmud but rather wishing to help guide those who immerse themselves in the study of Talmud to have in mind that the ultimate purpose of the study is not the deliberation in itself, however intellectually satisfying it may be, but to arrive at the knowledge of the law.
While Maimonides clarifies his intention regarding the study of the Talmud, it reflects the deep suspicion he encountered from his critics. One can thus understand the unrelenting opposition to Maimonides in the case of the law of liability of the borrower when a misreading of the Talmud text in their view appears to be so blatant.
A defence of Maimonides and the Talmud
We would like to argue that the criticism of Maimonides’ reading of the Talmud in this case is unwarranted and it is in fact possible to defend Maimonides in the view of the text of the Talmud itself.
In the case of the borrower the Talmud presents two parts of the law:
a. the presentation of the law
b. the application of the law in the form of the case studies
The first part of the text - the presentation of the law - is the question about an animal that becomes emaciated or dies through the work. Raba clarifies the law that the borrower is not liable. In this part of the text the Talmud clearly states that the animal died ‘through’ the work and not necessarily ‘while’ performing the work.
The second part of the text – the case studies - however, presents three cases with the application of the law pertaining to a borrower where it is almost certain that it is referring to damage that occurred during the work itself.
The cases are:
- a bucket that breaks while filling
- an axe that breaks while chopping
- a cat that dies while and due to eating too many mice.
Although the Talmud does not explicitly say that the damage occurred ‘while’ the particular work was being conducted, an axe would almost certainly only break while it is being used and not while in a state of rest afterwards and the same is the case regarding the bucket. Similarly the cat obviously died in the midst of its work in achieving the riddance of the mice through consumption – the very work for which it was borrowed. In all these cases it is obvious that the damage occurred while the work was being done.
We can therefore understand that Maimonides is in fact basing his wording of the law of the Talmud: not on the opening presentation of the law but rather on the case studies that the Talmud itself presents. One can certainly therefore not accuse Maimonides of neglecting or misreading the Talmud. One may suggest that his understanding of the Talmudic text is that the case studies cited may in fact be what defines the law.
Narrative or normative law
Why then were the great legalists of the 13th century and later not more sympathetic to the reading of Maimonides; after all he is basing his definition of the law on the text of the Talmud with good reason. Dr. Jacob Shapira of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in a paper delivered at the Oxford University Chabad Society (May 23rd 2015), entitled ‘Narrative as a Tool of Halakhic Expression in the Babylonian Talmud – The Narrative Ruling as Opposed to Normative Ruling’, argues that Maimonides perceives narrative in the Babylonian Talmud as a tool of Halakhic expression. This is demonstrated in the following case in the Talmud (Kiddushin 31b):
Rav Assi had an aged mother. She said to him, ‘I want jewellery.’ So he made them for her. ‘I want a husband.’ — ‘I will look out for you'. ‘I want a husband as handsome as you.’ Thereupon he left her and went to the land of Israel. On hearing that she was following him he went to R. Johanan and asked him: ‘May I leave the land of Israel for abroad?’ ‘It is forbidden,’ he replied. ‘But what if it is to meet my mother?’ ‘I do not know’, said he. He waited a short time and went before him again. ‘Assi’, said he, ‘have you decided to go? May the Omnipresent bring you back in peace.’ Then he went before R. Eleazar and said to him, ‘Perhaps, God forbid, he was angry?’ ‘What then did he say to you?’ enquired he. ‘May the Omnipresent bring you back in peace’, was the answer. Had he been angry, he rejoined, ‘he would not have blessed you’. In the meanwhile he learnt that her coffin was coming. ‘Had I known’, he exclaimed: ‘I would not have left.’
Subsequently, Maimonides codifies the law of the deranged parent in his Mishneh Torah (Hilchot Mamerim 6:10):
When a person's father or mother loses control of their mental faculties, their son should try to conduct his relationship with them according to their mental condition until G-d has mercy upon them. If it is impossible for him to remain with them because they have become mentally deranged, he should leave them, depart, and charge others with caring for them in an appropriate manner.
This law is however challenged by the glosses of Ra'avad on Maimonides: ’Abraham said: This ruling is not correct, for if he leaves and deserts her, whom could he ask to take care of her’. It would appear that Ra’avad disputes not just the classification of the law but the view that one may bring a law based on a narrative in the Talmud. In truth, however, even if Ra’avad maintains this point of view, the rest of the legalists and commentaries to Maimonides pertaining to this law do not seem troubled by this utilization of narrative as law; on the contrary, they defend the view of Maimonides against the Ra’avad’s critique. This includes Rabeinu Nissim of Girona (1329-1376), Rabbi Joseph Caro and Rabbi David ben Solomon ibn Zimra, known as Radbaz (c. 1479-1573). They clarify that as Maimonides is basing his legal ruling on the text of the Talmud, albeit a narrative, in their view it is acceptable and in defence of Maimonides, they argue, one may presume that it is referring to a case where the son charges someone else suitable to look after his mother while the son resides abroad.
This defence of Maimonides’ view regarding the deranged mother implies that Maimonides is not alone in his view that Talmudic narrative may be used as a tool for law. In the case of the borrower, therefore, it would be incorrect to suggest that the dispute between Maimonides and his opponents is based on how they view literary as opposed to normative narrative in the Talmud. Rather, it would appear that the dispute is in light of the fact that the Talmud contradicts itself in its definition of the case between the normative and the narrative. In the normative the text states that the case is when the animal dies through the work whereas in the narrative it implies that the borrower is only liable when the damage occurs at the time of the work itself. One may suggest then that in such a case where there is contradiction between narrative and normative ruling in the Talmud, Nachmanides and colleagues maintain one must follow the normative, whereas Maimonides is of the view that when the narrative follows the normative it may be construed that the narrative is intended to interpret and qualify the normative as the definition of the law.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we presented the two versions of Maimonides' law of a borrower, arguing that in light of the omission of a paragraph in the draft, it is possible that the view of Maimonides relating to the exemption of liablity of a borrower when an animal dies after but on the account of the work is not in conflict with his opponents after all. In addition, according to the published version that indicates a irreconcilable disagreement between Maimonides and his opponents, this law of the borrower in the opening of the laws of Borrowing and Deposit should certainly not be seen as part of a theory that Maimonides had a disregard for the Talmud. On the contrary, in view of the above, one may see Maimonides’ meticulous analysis of the Talmud in the writing of his legal work Mishneh Torah as the basis for his edited version even in face of stiff opposition for centuries afterwards.
Kindly edited with the help of Sara Feldman and Dovid Brackman